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A B S T R A C T   
Ship strikes are one of the main human-induced threats to whale survival. A variety of measures have been used 
or proposed to reduce collisions and subsequent mortality of whales. These include operational measures, such as 
mandatory speed reduction, or technical ones, such as detection tools. There is, however, a lack of a systematic 
approach to assessing the various measures that can mitigate the risk of ship collisions with whales. In this paper, 
a holistic approach is proposed to evaluate mitigation measures based on a risk assessment framework that has 
been adopted by the International Maritime Organization (IMO), namely the Formal Safety Assessment (FSA). 
Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) is “a rational and systematic process for assessing the risk related to maritime safety 
and the protection of the marine environment and for evaluating the costs and benefits of IMO’s options for reducing 
these risks”. The paper conceptualizes the use of a systematic risk assessment methodology, namely the FSA, to 
assess measures to reduce the risk of collisions between ships and whales.   
1. Introduction 
Cetaceans face several threats to survival. Most of these threats are 
human-induced or amplified by human activities: whaling [1–3], 
entanglement [4], ship collisions [5,6], ocean noise [7], pollution [8], 
climate change [9]. While difficult to quantify, ship collisions are known 
to be major threats to whales [5,6]. The severity of the threat arises due 
to three main factors. First, the overlap between areas with a high 
density of whales and ships creates areas with high probabilities of en-
counters [10,11]. Second, collisions that do occur have a high proba-
bility of whale mortality. Indeed, at a ship speed of 12 knots, there is a 
50% probability of whale mortality following a collision event. This 
probability reaches respectively 70% and 90% at 14kn and 18kn [12]. 
Third, the risk of collision also has increased over the years as a result of 
increased ship traffic [13,14]. Combined, these factors contribute to an 
ever-growing threat to whale survival. Many authors highlight that the 
level of threat in certain areas put at risk the populations’ survival (e.g., 
Mediterranean fin whales (Balaenoptera physalus) and sperm whales 
(Physeter macrocephalus), New Zealand Bryde’s whales (Balaenoptera 
edeni) [15–17]). The most illustrative case remains the North Atlantic 
right whales (Eubalaena glacialis). This population is likely to be extinct 
within approximately 200 years if the collision issue is left unmanaged 
[18]. 
A variety of approaches have been developed to reduce the threat of 
collisions with ships. These approaches can be classified as either 
operational or technical measures. Operational measures are related to 
approaches that involve a change in the way ships navigate. The more 
widespread operational management tools are: area to be avoided 
(ATBA), traffic separation schemes (TSS), or speed reduction (SR) 
[19–23]. Technical measures include onboard and off-board tools to 
detect whales, among others: visual observation networks (e.g., the 
Real-Time Plotting of Cetaceans System - REPCET, Whale Alert, Whale 
Safe), acoustic networks, dedicated observers, thermal night navigator, 
and predictive modeling [24–28]. 
The lack of a holistic approach covering the cost-effectiveness, the 
regulatory regime, and the compliance of existing collision avoidance 
tools, are likely to have been barriers to the successful implementation 
of the various measures. Often, cost, compliance, risk reduction, and 
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regulatory status are parameters independently studied when consid-
ering the whale collision issue (cf. Supplementary Material S1). Indeed, 
the lack of a holistic view prevents the adoption of mitigation measures 
and has been used by shipping industries as an excuse not to act [5,29, 
30]. To be noted that some successful cases dealing with ship-whale 
collision have integrated a more holistic approach, leading to higher 
compliance of the shipping industry (e.g., Panama [31]), even engaging 
them in voluntary actions [17]. The North Atlantic right whales case is a 
good illustration of the processing of several parameters to achieve a 
successful interdisciplinary approach [24,32]. Constantine et al. [17], 
also proved that the implication of the shipping industry stakeholders in 
the New Zealand Bryde’s whale collision issue could lean towards 
voluntary mitigation actions and engage the shipping industry toward 
social license [33]. 
As highlighted in the recommendations of the 2019 Conference on 
Marine Mammal Protected Areas (ICMMPA), a more holistic approach to 
reducing the risk of collision between ships and whales, for instance, 
through risk assessment, is needed. One such way to standardize these 
assessments is the Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) used by the Inter-
national Maritime Organization (IMO). The FSA is “a rational and sys-
tematic process for accessing the risk related to maritime safety and the 
protection of the marine environment and for evaluating the costs and benefits 
of IMO’s options for reducing these risks” (see FSA Guidelines in Ref. [34]). 
The use of the FSA for environmental issues is somewhat limited and has 
mainly focused on oil spills [35,36]. However, the use of the Formal 
Safety Assessment (FSA) could be a way to standardize and better assess 
the potential of proposed solutions to reduce whale collisions. 
The IMO is a United Nations organization that deals with all aspects 
of maritime safety and the protection of the marine environment. The 
IMO’s primary objective is to develop and maintain a comprehensive 
regulatory framework for shipping [37]. The management of safety at 
sea is based on a set of accepted rules that are, in general, agreed through 
the IMO. The work of the IMO on the protection of whales has been 
somewhat limited. So far, the IMO has issued few resolutions and 
amendments towards the avoidance of whale collision, mainly focused 
on rerouting [38,39] or areas to be avoided [40]. While governments 
and organizations, such as the Agreement on the Conservation of Ceta-
ceans of the Black Sea, Mediterranean Sea and contiguous Atlantic area 
(ACCOBAMS) and the International Whaling Commission (IWC), have 
submitted various proposals to the IMO [41,42], it is difficult for the 
IMO to evaluate the proposed solutions. Indeed, the submitted cases 
follow an unstandardized format and do not account for the impact of 
these solutions on maritime traffic. These submissions often provide 
redundant information, such as just guidance to reduce collisions 
[43–47]. The IMO hardly ever adopts these incomplete recommenda-
tions [41] or only endorses them when the local regulations are 
pro-active [31]. 
The objective of this paper is to conceptualize the use of the Formal 
Safety Assessment to address collisions between ships and whales. There 
are several challenges to this approach that the paper will outline in the 
following sections. For each step of the FSA, we discuss how this 
framework can be used within the scope of assessing the risks to whales. 
2. Using Formal Safety Assessment to reduce risks ship strikes 
2.1. An introduction to FSA 
The FSA draft guidelines were first adopted by the IMO’s Maritime 
Safety Committee (MSC), at its seventy-fourth session (30 May to 8 June 
2001), and the Marine Environment Protection Committee, at its forty- 
seventh session (4–8 March 2002) [48]. The guidelines have been 
revised twice since then, the latest revision being in April 2018 [34]. 
The FSA was drafted to address the four challenges to which any 
approach to modern maritime safety regulation must respond. It has to 
be [49]:  
� “Proactive – anticipating hazards, rather than waiting for accidents to 
reveal them which would in any case come at a cost in money and safety 
(of either human life or property i.e., the ship itself)  
� Systematic – using a formal and structured process  
� Transparent – being clear and justified of the safety level that is achieved  
� Cost-Effective – finding the balance between safety (in terms of risk 
reduction) and the cost to the stakeholders of the proposed risk control 
options” 
IMO envisaged FSA as a tool to help “in the evaluation of new regu-
lations for maritime safety and protection of the marine environment or in 
making a comparison between existing and possibly improved regulations, 
with a view to achieving a balance between the various technical and oper-
ational issues, including the human element, and between maritime safety or 
protection of the marine environment and costs” [49]. Although the FSA 
framework was first designed and intended to be used for the evaluation 
of new or existing regulations, its uses are not limited to the IMO 
context. FSA follows the essential steps of a risk assessment methodology 
in line with the ISO 31000:2009, which is to provide principles and 
generic guidelines on risk management as codified by the International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO). For a detailed analysis of the 
Formal Safety Assessment Framework and the latest developments see 
Kontovas [50] or Kontovas and Psaraftis [51]. 
The FSA framework is composed of 5 steps that integrate all aspects 
of potential regulations that are relevant to the shipping industry 
(Fig. 1):  
� Step 1: identification of hazards;  
� Step 2: assessment of risks;  
� Step 3: risk control options;  
� Step 4: cost-benefit assessment; and  
� Step 5: recommendations for decision-making. 
2.2. Step 1: hazard identification 
According to the FSA Guidelines [34], the hazard identification step 
aims to identify all potential hazardous scenarios, which could lead to 
significant consequences and prioritize them by risk level. In our case 
study, the collision event is considered as the main event. Thus, Step 1 
aims to identify hazards that contribute the most to the collision. The 
completion of this step will most probably require the creation of an 
expert focus group but reviewing the literature and consultations with 
the industry lead to a first hazard identification. The collision hazards 
were divided into two main categories (detection failure and avoidance 
failure) and six sub-categories (see Fig. 2). The list of hazards in those 
sub-categories, which are briefly outlined below, can be found in the 
Supplementary Material S1.  
� Visual detection failure: 
The failure of the crew to detect a whale at the sea surface. These 
hazards have human or environmental origins. The hazards driven by 
human factors are related to the competence and the capacity of the 
crew (e.g., failure to identify visually a whale, inattention due to 
multitasking, fatigue [11,52–57]). The hazards driven by environmental 
factors exogenous to the ship. For instance, depending on the areas and 
the seasons, the whale density varies, and so does the probability of 
detection. The same observation is true for the different species present, 
which will impact the probability of detection depending on their 
behavior (e.g., blow, dive with no fluke, dive with fluke, lunge feeding, 
resting, surface activity [58]). Meteorological events also impact the 
detection of whales (e.g., rain, haze, squall [52,55,57–59]).  
� Human avoidance failure: 
The failure of the crew to avoid a whale despite their effort to do so. 
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Human avoidance can be driven by: hierarchical unwillingness to speak 
up, lack or inadequate situational awareness or training, lack of master- 
pilot-master exchanges; inattention due to multitasking [57].  
� Ship technology detection failure: 
The failure of the shipboard equipment to detect a whale. As the 
effectiveness of RADAR, sonar, and other devices are limited to detect 
whales [52], the only technology failures here are dedicated tools to 
detect whales (e.g., REPCET).  
� Ship technology avoidance failure: 
The failure of the ship to avoid a whale despite actions taken to do so. 
Mechanical failure, especially a steering system failure or a complete 
black-out, may be defined as a hazard although those failures are less 
frequent in the most recent generations of ships [57]. Other hazards 
depend on the ship characteristics: turning radius and ship speed [52].  
� Detection and avoidance failure due to situational characteristics: 
The inability of the crew to engage in avoidance maneuvers due to 
external factors. This sub-category includes hazards of physical sur-
rounding and policy origin. Physical surrounding factors are linked to 
external events occurring during navigation: density of maritime traffic, 
close proximity of anchorages and harbor areas, proximity of 
Fig. 1. The Formal Safety Assessment framework (IMO, 2018). No color should be used in print.  
Fig. 2. Contributing events categories and sub-categories. Each sub-category includes contributing hazard to collision with whales. No color should be used in print.  
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navigational hazards (e.g., shoal), mix of maritime traffic, limited sea 
room (choke points), traffic congestion. Policy factors are linked to TSS 
and precautionary area, marine safety information, and navigation rules 
(COLREG) [57,60–62].  
� Detection and avoidance failure due to shipping industry 
characteristics: 
The commercial pressures preventing the crew from engaging ac-
tions to minimize the collision risk. Some of the hazards are internal to 
the company, such as pressures to arrive on time or other constraints (e. 
g., minimization of fuel consumption and air emissions) [57,63]. Those 
hazards are most of the time linked to some marine policies which 
compel the company to comply (such as the Sulphur Emission Control 
Areas – SECA or mandatory speed limits) [57]. 
As mentioned before, each of these hazards needs to be validated and 
ranked. To achieve the latter, the use of the qualitative Delphi method 
can be utilized to reach a consensus [34,51]. The biggest challenge is the 
lack of data regarding how these factors affect whale collisions. While 
the identification of hazards is reasonably straightforward in the liter-
ature, their contribution is hard to estimate. This difficulty lies in the fact 
that ships rarely notice the collision with a whale, and when they do, it 
often goes unreported [53,64–69]. 
2.3. Step 2: risk analysis 
According to the FSA Guidelines [34], the risk analysis step aims to 
obtain a quantitative measure of the probability of occurrence of risk 
contributors and an evaluation of the potential consequences associated 
with the identified hazards in the previous step. Usually, the applica-
tions of FSA focus on events such as ship-ship collisions, groundings, 
fires/explosion [70–72] for which there are available casualty data-
bases. For example, the IHS Sea-web Casualties database (formerly 
known as Lloyd’s Register-Fairplay) and Lloyd’s List Intelligence Casu-
alties Service are fairly complete and can be used to provide a proba-
bility of hazards occurrence [73,74]. Data on collisions between whales 
and ships are less well organized. While the IWC maintains a database of 
most of the proven whale collision events, several other published da-
tabases provide additional or complementary data [64,65]. Neverthe-
less, those databases do not have a lot of recorded events in comparison 
to other casualty databases. A review of the IMO casualty database 
(1997–2018) finds that no events were recorded as “Undefined” or 
“Contact”. “Contact” data reflect events of “striking or being struck by an 
external substance but not another ship or the sea bottom”. The same inquiry 
needs to be achieved in Lloyd’s database to assess its content. Other 
relevant data can also be investigated in the national marine mammal 
stranding networks databases. Despite the existing databases, most of 
the whale collisions go unnoticed due to the low detection rate [52,58]. 
Indeed, the small percentage of dead whales that strand and the 
decomposition state of the related carcasses often prevent the identifi-
cation of the mortalities induced by collisions [65,75–77]. 
An adaptation of the FSA risk analysis is needed to account for the 
lack of data issue. Over the past decades, ship-whale collision risk an-
alyses have evolved from simplistic approaches to more complex ones, 
which are outlined as follows (see also Table 1 for a summary):  
� Approach A: human-induced direct mortality 
Approach A is used in the case where AIS data and abundance data 
are not available. In the absence of these data, the stranding data from 
the national stranding data networks are here used. The relation be-
tween stranding or drifting carcasses and causes of mortality in the 
stranding data is used in combination with a natural mortality rate to 
assess a carcass detection rate depending on the whale species [78–80]. 
The number of dead whales due to collisions is assessed using this rate 
[15]. Due to the heterogeneity of the data gathered by the stranding 
networks [6], the calculated risk from this approach will most likely be 
underestimated. This approach allows an assessment at the whale pop-
ulation’s home range scale, but also at a smaller scale. Nevertheless, the 
precision of this approach can decrease depending on the scale of the 
study site, as carcasses can drift outside or inside the study site [81]. The 
main advantages of this approach are that it does not need a lot of data 
and is thus not expensive.  
� Approach B: collision indicator 
Approach B is used in the case where AIS data and abundance data 
are partially available. Whale abundance and ship density are used to 
extract status indicators that are overlapped in order to assess the risk of 
collision [82]. For this approach, the collision risk analysis model of 
Martins et al. [82], seems to be the most suited option given its holistic 
approach. Martins et al. [82], defined the risk of collision indicators as 
the sum of value attributed to the whale density and the shipping den-
sity. To be noted that whale density indicator can be defined either from 
whale calculated density [83,84] or expert judgment density [85]. While 
more precise than Approach A, this approach has the disadvantage of 
requiring a more significant amount of data, involving a higher cost of 
implementation. Despite its simplistic semi-quantitative methodology, 
this approach was only developed a few years ago, after approach C.  
� Approach C: lethal collision probability 
Approach C is used when both AIS data and abundance data are 
available. Two types of models have been integrated into this approach. 
First, the quantitative probability of a collision between a ship and a 
whale is investigated [21]. Then, the main assumption that ship speed is 
directly linked to the probability of mortality is integrated into models 
[12,80]. Hence, unlike Approach B, this approach addresses quantita-
tively both the frequency and the severity of a collision. Lately, models 
were spatialized and upscaled to cover larger areas and integrate a more 
holistic approach (Fig. 3 [69,86,88]). Approach C has the advantage of 
having a higher grid resolution and a more precise level of risk, as the 
density of ships is available quantitatively, whereas approach B quali-
tatively grades the density. This higher resolution comes at a higher cost. 
The most critical challenge in the Risk Analysis Step is to define the 
level of risk that is acceptable to the regulators or the society. It is 
obviously difficult to estimate the risk based on each approach, but it is 
even more challenging to determine whether this level of risk is 
acceptable, e.g., mitigation measures are needed, or not. Indeed, the 
impact of a collision needs to be assessed at a population level and not at 
the individual whale level. Indeed, the cumulative effect of whale deaths 
matters. In other words, the death of 10 whales due to collisions might 
Table 1 
Characteristics of existing collision risk assessment approaches.  
Type of risk assessment Output Characteristics Primary source 
Frequency of collision Severity of collision Output example Price Precision Amount of data needed 
Approach A Yes Yes Number of lethal collisions Low Low Low [15] 
Approach B Yes No Collision risk indicators Medium Medium Medium [82] 
Approach C Yes No Probability of collisions High High Medium [88] 
Yes Yes Probability of lethal collisions High High High [21]  
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not impact a population, but 20 deaths might lead to a decline of this 
population. To define the severity, a population viability analysis (PVA) 
can be adapted to do this assessment. A PVA is a process aiming to 
evaluate the likelihood that a population will persist in the future [89]. 
To be noted that in some areas, the gap of knowledge on the whale 
population or the lack of financial support might limit the effectiveness 
the PVA implementation [90,91]. In those cases, the IMO guideline al-
lows the intervention of experts to define the risk qualitatively, but 
advocate for a transparent methodology [34]. 
In line with the FSA framework, an adaptation of the As Low As 
Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) concept could be used to incorporate 
PVA [92]. ALARP arises from UK legislation, particularly the Health and 
Safety at Work etc. Act 1974, which requires “Provision and maintenance 
of plant and systems of work that are, so far as is reasonably practicable, safe 
and without risks to health”. According to this framework, there are three 
categories of risk tolerance: Unacceptable Risk, ALARP, and Acceptable 
Risk. Unacceptable Risk (for example resulting from a high accident 
frequency and a high number of fatalities) should either be forbidden or 
reduced at any cost. Between this Unacceptable Risk and the Acceptable 
Risk (where no action to be taken is needed), the ALARP range of risk is 
defined. In this range, the risk should be reduced until it is no longer 
reasonable (i.e. economically feasible) to reduce the risk. 
Here, the paper proposes the ALARP range of risk using Limit 
Reference Points (LRP) in the calculation of PVA to set boundaries of 
tolerable risk and assess the threshold risk of collision. Limit Reference 
Points (LRP) provide an assessment of the number of individuals that 
can be removed from the population without threatening its survival 
[93]. Fig. 4 illustrates a possible adaptation of the ALARP approach, 
using two LRPs of different level of objective: “2% criterion” [94,95] and 
Potential Biological Removal (PBR [96,97]). Other approaches can be 
investigated, such as the adaptation of the concept of “No Net Loss” 
[98]. 
Fig. 3. Assessment of the ship-right whale encounter risk (a), the lethal collision risk (b) at small scale (Bay of Fundy, Canada; Vanderlaan et al., [87], © 
Inter-Research 2008) and the lethal blue (c1), humpback (c2) and fin whales (c3) at large scale (US West Coast; Rockwood, Calambokidis and Jahncke [69]). No color 
should be used in print 
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2.4. Step 3: risk control options 
According to the FSA Guidelines [34], the purpose of Step 3 is to 
propose effective and practical Risk Control Options (RCOs) comprising 
the following four principal stages:  
� “Focusing on risk areas needing control;  
� Identifying potential risk control measures (RCMs);  
� Evaluating the effectiveness of the RCMs in reducing risk by re-evaluating 
step 2; and  
� Grouping RCMs into practical regulatory options.” 
Thus, one of the first tasks in Step 3, is to identify measures that 
reduce the risk of whale collisions based on the top hazards that have 
been identified in Step 1. These measures are called Risk Control Mea-
sures (RCM) in the FSA terminology. RCMs can either prevent, mitigate, 
or reverse the impacts of the top hazards. They are discussed in the 
expert focus group to assess their effectiveness. A lack of data is, again, 
an obstacle that can be overcome through expert judgment. For each of 
key RCMs, Step 2 is repeated to assess the potential risk reduction 
induced. More than one RCM can be combined into groups which are 
referred to as Risk Control Options (RCO) [34,50]. 
Several RCMs have been identified in the literature and consist of 
either operational or technical measures. Operational RCMs (ORCM) are 
usually related to the way that ships should be operated. In most cases, 
voluntary or mandatory navigation recommendations are implemented, 
such as reducing the operational speed in specific areas or traffic man-
agement route systems (see Table 2). Technical measures (TRCM) are 
control measures that aims to better detect whales (see Table 3). They 
provide information on the location of whales or on the location of 
whale high-density areas. TRCMs can provide information to mariners 
that may lead to the more efficient implementation of ORCMs. For 
example, the Boston passive acoustic network (TRCM-6) is synchronized 
with ORCM-8 and ORCM-11 [99,100]. 
The most critical process in Step 3 is the evaluation of the effec-
tiveness of each measure to reduce the risk of ship strikes. In the liter-
ature, most of the assessments are ex-ante analyses that process either 
the compliance or the risk reduction induced (see Supplementary Ma-
terial S1 and also [11,122]). However, some studies have analysed both 
parameters. 
First, some ex-ante studies used theoretical full compliance with 
RCMs from the shipping industry to study the risk reduction induced. In 
those cases, the risk reduction induced can vary from low to high value 
(see Table 4). Usually, SR measures tend to have a lower impact on the 
risk of collision than TSS measures. Second, regarding post ante ana-
lyses, the compliance does not seem to be linked to the mandatory status 
(Table 4). To be noted that in some cases, low compliance involves an 
equivalent risk reduction than high compliance (ORCM-15 vs. ORCM-2). 
Further, the effectiveness of a solution may vary between the time of 
implementation and the years that follow, as it was exhibited in several 
studies (e.g., ORCM-2, ORCM-16, ORCM-17 [111,123]). The effective-
ness of TRCMs varies too much to require an extensive literature review 
in this paper. For more information on TRCMs effectiveness, the inter-
ested reader can refer to the work of Silber, Bettridge, and Cottingham 
[52]. 
The efficiency of the RCO/RCM depends on several parameters: its 
best-case effectiveness to reduce the risk, and the stakeholders’ 
compliance, which in turn depends on the broad costs and benefits of 
implementation, the regulatory status associated with the RCO/RCM (e. 
g. mandatory or voluntary), and the vigorousness of enforcement 
[124–126]. The efficiency of RCOs/RCMs is often debated in the liter-
ature. While models may help to evaluate the effectiveness of a solution, 
this is generally under the assumption of full compliance from the 
shipping industry, which is the theoretical best-case scenario [87,101, 
Table 2 
Existing or tested Operational Risk Control Measures to avoid whale collisions.  
Code ORCM Spatial status Temporal status Legislative status For example 
ORCM-1 Speed Reduction (SR) Fixed Temporary Mandatory [101] 
ORCM-2 Speed Reduction (SR) Fixed Temporary Voluntary [102] 
ORCM-3 Speed Reduction (SR) Fixed Fixed Mandatory [103] 
ORCM-4 Speed Reduction (SR) Fixed Fixed Voluntary [17] 
ORCM-5 Speed Reduction (SR) Dynamic Dynamic Voluntary [100] 
ORCM-6 Speed Reduction (SR) Fixed Dynamic Mandatory [104] 
ORCM-7 Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS) Fixed Temporary Mandatory [105] 
ORCM-8 Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS) Fixed Temporary Voluntary [19] 
ORCM-9 Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS) Fixed Fixed Mandatory [106] 
ORCM-10 Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS) Fixed Fixed Voluntary [107] 
ORCM-11 SR and TSS Fixed Temporary Voluntary [108] 
ORCM-12 SR and TSS Fixed Fixed Mandatory [109] 
ORCM-13 SR and TSS Fixed Fixed Voluntary [110] 
ORCM-14 Area To Be Avoided (ATBA) Fixed Temporary Voluntary [23] 
ORCM-15 Area To Be Avoided (ATBA) Fixed Fixed Voluntary [108] 
ORCM-16 SR and ATBA Fixed Temporary Voluntary [111] 
ORCM-17 SR, TSS, and ATBA Fixed Temporary Voluntary [111]  
Fig. 4. Possible adaptation of the As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) 
approach to the whale-ship collision issue, bounded by the Potential Biological 
Removal (PBR) and the “2% criterion”. Green arrows represent positive evo-
lutions of the HIDM related to collisions and red striped arrows negative ones. 
Adapted from Ref. [92]. No color should be used in print 
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106]. The FSA proposes a framework where all parameters can be pro-
cessed in an interdisciplinary approach [32]. As the efficiency is difficult 
to be accurately quantified, the transition from effectiveness to effi-
ciency as a measure of outcome is often accomplished by calculating a 
cost-effectiveness proxy [127] that is discussed, among others, in Step 4. 
2.5. Step 4: assessing the costs and benefits 
According to the FSA Guidelines [34], the purpose of Step 4 is to 
identify and compare the benefits and costs associated with the imple-
mentation of each RCO identified and defined in Step 3. A cost-benefit 
assessment may consist of the following stages:  
� “Consider the risks assessed in Step 2, both in terms of frequency and 
consequence, in order to define the base case in terms of risk levels of the 
situation under consideration;  
� Arrange the RCOs, defined in Step 3, in a way to facilitate understanding 
of the costs and benefits resulting from the adoption of an RCO;  
� Estimate the pertinent costs and benefits for all RCOs;  
� Estimate and compare the cost-effectiveness of each option, in terms of the 
cost per unit of risk reduction by dividing the net cost by the risk reduction 
achieved as a result of implementing the option; and  
� Rank the RCOs from a cost-benefit perspective in order to facilitate the 
decision-making recommendations in Step 5 (e.g., to screen those which 
are not cost-effective or impractical).” 
2.5.1. The cost-effectiveness analysis 
The cost and benefit values associated with an RCM have to be 
combined with the risk reduction to assess the costs and the benefits per 
percentage of risk reduction [34]. Until recently, this step was focusing 
mainly on human safety. There are several indices, which express 
cost-effectiveness depending on the safety of life such as Gross Cost of 
Averting a Fatality (Gross CAF) and Net Cost of Averting a Fatality (Net 
CAF) as described in the FSA guidelines. The numerator of the Net CAF 
integrates the benefit, whereas the Gross CAF does not. Hence, Net CAF 
is much more adapted to environmental issues, as other benefits such as 
avoiding environmental damages could be considered. 
Since 2006, the FSA framework has opened up to the analysis of risk 
evaluation criteria for accidental releases to the environment, and spe-
cifically for releases of oil. Discussions on this matter were sparked to a 
significant extent by EU research project SAFEDOR [128], which 
defined the criterion of CATS (Cost to Avert one Tonne of Spilled oil) as 
an environmental criterion equivalent to CAF [129]. Even though the 
FSA guidelines only include provisions to assess the environmental 
damages from oil spills [63], other risk acceptance criterions have been 
developed and considered for FSA application through recent years 
[130]. These criterions are mainly focused on air emission, but 
encourage researches to built relevant criterions for risk assessments, as 
advocated by the FSA guidelines [34]. 
In order to assess risk reduction measures related to ship collisions 
with whales, by using the FSA framework, there is a need to define an 
index “in terms of the cost per risk reduction unit by dividing the net cost by 
the risk reduction achieved as a result of implementing the option”. For ship 
strikes, our study, therefore, proposes a similar cost-effectiveness index, 
named Net Cost to Avert a Whale Fatality (NCAWF), as follows: 
NCAWF ¼
ΔC   ΔB
ΔR  
where ΔC is the cost per ship of the RCO under consideration; ΔB is the 
economic benefit per ship resulting from the implementation of the 
RCO; ΔR is the risk reduction depending on the number of fatalities 
averted, induced by the RCO. Note that the risk reduction ΔR is assessed 
in Step 3. 
The costs and benefits should cover the entire lifetime of the measure 
and anticipate the potential future modification of the context [34]. For 
example, a change can appear in whales habitat use or abundance, or 
Table 3 
Technical Risk Control Measures to avoid whale collisions.  
Code TRCM Examples of implementation/test For example 
TRCM-1 Right Whale Sighting Advisory System US waters [27] 
TRCM-2 REPCET Pelagos and Agoa Sanctuaries [25] 
TRCM-3 Whale Alert US waters [112] 
TRCM-4 Visual detection (dedicated) Boston [56] 
TRCM-4 Tagging and telemetry Theoretical [52] 
TRCM-6 Passive acoustics Boston [52] 
TRCM-7 Ship mounted passive acoustics France [113] 
TRCM-8 Active acoustics Theoretical [52] 
TRCM-9 Radar Australia [114] 
TRCM-10 Infrared Australia [115] 
TRCM-11 Predictive modeling California (US) [116] 
TRCM-12 Sonar Hawaii (US) [117] 
TRCM-13 US Navy Sound Surveillance System Washington (US) [118] 
TRCM-14 Acoustic Harassment and Deterrent Devices Bay of Fundy (Canada) [119] 
TRCM-15 Night scope US waters [119] 
TRCM-16 Satellite imagery Theoretical [52]  
Table 4 
Compliance and risk reduction induced by various operational RCMs.  
Code ORCM Legislative 
status 
Compliance 
(%) 
Risk 
reduction 
induced (%) 
For 
example 
ORCM- 
1a 
SR Mandatory 75 38.5 [101] 
ORCM- 
1b 
SR Theoretical 100 7.5–52 [109] 
ORCM- 
2 
SR Voluntary 72 35–40 [123] 
ORCM- 
3 
SR Theoretical 100 3.7–56.7 [103] 
ORCM- 
8 
TSS Theoretical 100 10–32 [19] 
ORCM- 
9 
TSS Theoretical 100 94.8 [106] 
ORCM- 
10 
TSS Voluntary 96.2 54.3 [101] 
ORCM- 
12 
SR and 
TSS 
Theoretical 100 69–75 [109] 
ORCM- 
14a 
ATBA Voluntary 71 82 [22] 
ORCM- 
14b 
ATBA Theoretical 100 39 [21] 
ORCM- 
16 
SR and 
ATBA 
Voluntary 9.3 28–34 [111] 
ORCM- 
17 
SR, TSS 
and 
ATBA 
Voluntary 9.7–11.2 36–40 [111]  
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even in shipping traffic (e.g., volume, port) [131,132]. These changes, 
which can be, or not related to the RCO implemented, need to be 
anticipated as well as possible. Several costs and benefits components 
come into play. Identified costs and benefits include:  
� The costs to implement the measure, which could include capital 
expenses [129];  
� The costs of maintenance [133]; 
� The costs of operation, direct or indirect ones, as the fuel consump-
tion or costs associated with delays in the time of arrival [52,122];  
� The benefits to avoid costs such as the repair costs after a collision or 
a ship loss [59,64,65], which may be calculated by using historical 
data. 
2.5.2. The cost-effectiveness criterion 
One of the underlined principles of FSA is that the decision-makers 
(Step 5) should be provided with recommendations of measures to 
reduce the risk that are cost-effective. In order to do so, a cost- 
effectiveness criterion should be used. To recommend an RCO for 
implementation, the cost-effectiveness index must be less than the cost- 
effectiveness criterion; otherwise, the RCO is rejected by the IMO. The 
cost-effectiveness criterion definition varies depending on the risk 
evaluated. It usually takes into account the following approaches [134, 
135]:  
� “Observations of the willingness to pay to avert a fatality;  
� Observations of past decisions and the costs involved with them;  
� Consideration of societal indicators.” 
The dominant yardstick in all FSA studies that have been submitted 
to the IMO so far is the so-called “$3 m criterion”. This criterion is to 
cover human fatalities from accidents and implicitly, also, injuries or ill 
health from them. This criterion was calculated using the third approach 
[136–138]. Indeed, the human safety criterion was inspired by the Life 
Quality Index, which takes its origin in a combination of life expectancy, 
wealth, and health indicators [139]. For environmental safety, the sec-
ond and third approaches are usually used [36,130]. For example, the 
criterion for the oil spill issue was calculated in function of the rescue 
and clean-up costs of historical events (2nd approach), whereas for 
carbon dioxide, its calculation was in function of the IPCC 2030 target 
(3rd approach) [129,140]. 
In the literature, there is currently no cost-effectiveness criterion to 
assess risks to whales. In our opinion, a combination of the second and 
third approach could be used. Indeed, for societal indicators (3rd 
approach), the cost of losing a whale can be looked into. Several ap-
proaches can be used and combined to achieve this assessment. First, 
contingent studies on the willingness to pay to protect whales can be 
done [141–145]. These studies are nevertheless costly and 
time-consuming [146]. One way to overcome these constraints is 
through a benefit transfer study using willingness to pay value from 
original studies [147–150]. Unfortunately, these kinds of studies suffer 
from different biases that tend to cause variation in results, related to 
factors such as methodology, location, species concerned, resident sta-
tus, payment vehicle and frequency [151]. Second, whales are since a 
few decades considered as biodiversity services as non-consumable 
direct use-value (e.g., whale watching). Using whale watching reve-
nues [152,153], the calculation of the lifetime value of a whale can lead 
to the assessment of the cost of losing a whale [154]. Finally, a market 
approach has emerged recently [155], although highly discussed 
[156–158]. 
As attributing a monetary value to biodiversity is increasingly criti-
cized [156,159–161], a multi-criteria analysis can also be considered as 
a new approach to assess the IMO criterion [162]. A multi-criteria 
analysis (MCA) is a decision-making approach combining conflicting 
ecological, social, political, and economic targets. The advantage of this 
approach is to integrate into the analysis the provisioning, regulating, 
and supporting services provided by whales [163–165]. Indeed, these 
services are most of the time not taken into consideration, as their 
monetary valuation is often not possible [166]. Similarly, ecological 
values can be considered as whales can act as ecosystem engineers or key 
species of ecosystem functioning [163,164]. Other dimensions could be 
integrated, using social indicators (e.g., reputational risk, proactive ac-
tion [30,167]). An MCA allows different languages of valuation to be 
used as indicators of each target [168]. Hence, a global valuation does 
not emerge from this approach, but an assessment of the cost and benefit 
can be put in perspective of other proposed solutions to mitigate the 
issue. Recently, different frameworks, that can be adaptable to the whale 
issue, emerged to value the marine ecosystems and biodiversity 
[169–172]. However, the MCA approach is outside the FSA guidelines 
and would imply an important change in the FSA framework. 
Regarding past decisions and the costs involved with them (2nd 
approach), the cost of carcasses management can be looked into, even 
though the fact that the cost is rarely paid by the shipping industry (Tab. 
6). For example, in France, the management of stranded carcasses is 
handled by the government, or by the harbor when a whale is stuck on a 
ship bow [59,173]. For the latest, some shipping industries insurance 
(P&I) may pay for carcass management. The cost of carcass management 
is variable depending on the countries. In some countries, the carcass is 
not processed and left to decomposition [174]. In others, the carcass is 
managed through knackery, explosion or submersion (e.g., in France 
with a cost between $28,000 and $89,000 ($US2016)) [173,174]. For 
those countries, the second approach may be considered. 
To summarise, as per the FSA Guidelines, the output from Step 4 
comprises of the following:  
� Costs and benefits for each RCO identified in Step 3;  
� Cost-effectiveness index, representing the cost per unit of risk 
reduction; and  
� Cost-effectiveness criterion, to be compared to the cost-effectiveness 
index for decision-making. 
To be noted that the mathematical equivalency between the cost- 
effectiveness analysis, as used within the FSA, and the classical cost- 
benefit assessment has been shown when using a cost-effectiveness 
criterion [50]. The most challenging process is to monetize benefits, 
especially the environmental ones. This step will most likely require the 
use of an economic value to quantify the benefit of avoiding a whale 
fatality. The above discussion exposed research angles that can be 
explored to achieve this challenging valuation. 
2.6. Step 5: recommendation for decision-making 
The final Step of FSA aims at giving recommendations to the decision 
makers for safety improvement, taking into consideration the findings 
during all four previous steps. The RCOs that are being recommended 
should reduce the risk to the “desired level” and be cost-effective [50]. 
To this extent, there is a need to define the desired or acceptable level of 
risk and clear cost-effectiveness criteria. According to the Guidelines, 
the purpose of this Step is to define recommendations, which should be 
presented to the decision-makers in an auditable and traceable manner. 
Note that the RCOs that should be proposed for implementation will be 
recommended by the decision-maker, in the case of FSA, this should be 
the IMO after receiving recommendations from a group of independent 
experts. The recommendations would be based upon the comparison 
and ranking of all hazards; the comparison and ranking of risk control 
options as a function of associated costs and benefits; and the identifi-
cation of those risk control options which keep risks as low as reasonably 
practicable (see the notion of ALARP in Section 2.3). 
3. Conclusions and future research 
Human activities induce or amplify threats to survival for some 
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whale populations. Although there are limited data on the various 
causes, ship collisions are known to be major threats to whales [6,18]. A 
variety of approaches have been considered to reduce this threat. These 
include operational measures such as mandatory speed reduction or 
technical ones, such as detection tools. There is, however, a lack of tools 
to systematically assess the various measures that can reduce the risk of 
ship collisions with whales. This impedes decision-makers recommen-
dations, government enforcement, or industries willingness to act [24, 
126,175–177]. Recent papers highlighted the potential improvement in 
collision management that can be offered by the IMO [175,178]. 
Therefore, this paper proposes a holistic approach through a risk 
assessment framework that has been adopted by the IMO, namely the 
FSA. The objective of this paper is to conceptualize the use of the FSA to 
address collisions between ships and whales. There are, however, many 
challenges in using FSA to assess measures that can reduce the risk of 
ship strikes. 
First, there is a lack of casualty data that can be used to identify the 
major hazards (Step 1). Most of the whale collisions go unnoticed due to 
the low detection rate, although some events have been identified in the 
literature [52,58]. Despite the limited data, by reviewing the literature 
and through consultation with the industry, this paper presents the 
major collision hazards, which have been divided into two main cate-
gories (detection failure and avoidance failure) and six sub-categories, 
see Fig. 2 for more. 
Second, there is a need for standardization of the risk analysis 
methods to estimate quantitatively the frequency and the consequence 
of collision (Step 2). There is actually a good basis for future research; 
see the vast amount of papers on this area as presented in Section 2.3. 
Indeed, numerous studies, on the probability of encounter between a 
ship and a whale [15,21] and its consequence (i.e., the probability of 
whale mortality), expressed in most cases as a function of the ship speed 
[12,69,80], can be used in Step 2. Nonetheless, the most critical chal-
lenge though in this step is not the evaluation of the risk but to define the 
level of risk that is acceptable to the regulators or the society. What level 
of risk is acceptable? How many deaths of whales are acceptable? These 
are very tough moral questions to be asked. This paper does not 
approach risk acceptance at an individual level, but rather at a popu-
lation level. Our approach uses the notion of Limit Reference Points 
(LRP), which is an assessment of the number of individuals that can be 
removed from the population without threatening its survival. A first 
approach using the ALARP notion is introduced, but most research is 
required in this area. Alternatives such as the “No net loss” approach 
could be investigated [98]. 
Finally, the biggest challenge lies in Step 4. The FSA calls for a cost- 
effectiveness analysis to be performed. The paper has therefore pre-
sented an index, which is defined as Net Cost to Avert a Whale Fatality 
(NCAWF). The main challenge is to monetize the benefits for risk re-
ductions, as this in one way or another requires monetizing the benefit of 
protecting a whale. Attributing a monetary value to biodiversity is 
increasingly criticized, but the paper nevertheless presents in Section 2.5 
(see also Table 5) some proposals for such a value. This is the first 
approach to an area that requires further research. 
Furthermore, the FSA is a lengthy and potentially expensive process, 
which might not be sufficient in some situations, especially in critical 
situations. The above steps, and especially the ones related to thresh-
olds, need to be carefully looked at in cases where urgent actions are 
required, i.e., in crisis management. For example, the North Atlantic 
right whale is one of the world’s most endangered large whale species. 
In 2017, the mass mortality of this species occurred in Canadian waters 
over a 3 month period [179]. Stringent risk tolerance limits (e.g., risk 
tolerance for killing right whales near to zero), and the implementation 
of very costly policy measures were needed to tackle this issue. Our 
approach could work in crisis situations by having very low-risk 
acceptance limits and at the same time setting higher 
cost-effectiveness criteria. 
To sum up, this paper conceptualizes the use of a systematic decision- 
making methodology, namely the FSA, to assess the risks of ship strikes. 
The paper highlights the main areas in the methodology that need to be 
further addressed, and at the same time, summarises our findings of the 
major hazards, as well as, the main risk control measures that have been 
adopted by various national and international regulators. It is hoped that 
this work could spark further research in this area, which could lead to 
more transparent and systematic assessment of the risks related to col-
lisions between ships and whales, and help propose cost-effective mea-
sures to reduce the related risks. In the end, this approach may lead to 
the emergence of control options that take into consideration both whale 
conservation and maritime traffic stakes, contributing to a better 
compliance of the shipping industry to those options. 
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